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Co-Conspirator Declarations: The
Federal Rules of Evidence and

Other Recent Developments, From
a Criminal Law Perspective*
by Paul Marcus**

Perhaps the most important advantage available to a prosecutor
in a criminal conspiracy case is the exception to the hearsay rule for
co-conspirator declarations. The exception is widely used and is
often a significant part of the government presentation. 1 In essence,
it provides that otherwise inadmissible hearsay declarations of coconspirators are admissible at trial against the defendant so long as
they were made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.2 The exception typically arises when an alleged co-conspiratordeclarant tells the witness (often an undercover police officer) all
about the conspiracy, perhaps in the hope of attracting a buyer or a
seller of drugs. During the conversation the defendant is identified
as a member of the group. The witness then is called to testify at
trial about this conversation.
Numerous judges and commentators have explored why the exception is so important in a case like this. Basically it is because the
declarant is often not available for cross-examination, and the witness is now specifically naming this defendant as having participated

in the conspiracy.3 During the last several years, major changes have
taken place which have affected the exception itself, its general appli~ation, and proof problems in connection with specific types of conspiracies. While some of these issues have been addressed
previously,4 they have been viewed primarily from the vantage point
*
**

©1979 by Paul Marcus.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
l. Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65
GEORGETOWN L. J. 925, 941 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Agreement].
2. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
3. See generally, P. MARCUS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES (Matthew Bender and Co., 1978, 1979 Supplement) at Section 5.02 [hereinafter
cited as PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE).
4. See, e.g., Bergman The Co-Conspirators Exception: Defining the Standard of the Independent Evidence Test under the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 99
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of persons with expertise in the area of evidence law. Rarely, how-

ever, have these problems been analyzed in terms of general criminal
law issues such as the quantum of proof required at trial or the procedures to be employed at a conspiracy trial.
This article will focus attention on five major aspects of the coconspirator exception shaped considerably by recent events: the
structure of the exception, the three elements of the exception, trial
procedures utilized in connection with it, confrontation clause challenges to it, and the scope of the conspiracy. Numerous other
problems are related to the hearsay exception and indeed can be vital to the trial and appellate practice in conspiracy cases. 5 Nevertheless, such problems have been omitted here either because there have
been few recent developments of significance, or because the relation
is not close. 6
THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION

The Rationale

The co-conspirator declaration is a well-established exception to
the hearsay rule. Indeed, the co-conspirator exception is so well-established that the co-conspirator's statements are allowed in even if
no conspiracy is charged so long as there is evidence supporting a
conspiracy theory? The exception has been severely criticized by
(1976); Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigation: Pulling
the Conspiracy Back into the Co-conspirator Rule, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1976).
5. These problems involve a wide range of issues: general proof questions-see, e.g.,
United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir. 1960), the state of mind requirement of
defendants-see, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) and issues combining both
double jeopardy questions and the traditional Wharton's Rule contention-see, e.g. Iannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
6. One recurring trial matter worthy of note is the general practice of naming unindicted
co-conspirators in the indictment. This is coming under attack throughout the country. This
problem is, of course, related to the hearsay exception question, for while the original declar·
ant may be an unindicted co-conspirator, the presence of the co-conspirator's name in the
indictment or in the bill of particulars will not determine the admissibility of the declaration.
In United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 805 (5th Cir. 1975), the two appellants were not
charged but were named in the indictment, while other persons were alleged to be conspirators
but their names were not given in the indictment. The court concluded that due process required that the indictments be expunged so that all references to the appellants were deleted,
and suggested the use of a bill of particulars as a suitable alternative for the government. Most
courts to consider the question since Briggs have followed its lead and ordered the names of
unindicted co-conspirators to be expunged from the indictment. United States v. Chadwick,
556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Porro, 152 N.J. Supr. 179, 377 A.2d 909 (1977), appeal
dismissed, 391 A.2d 517 (1978). For a particularly good discussion of the problem, see Application of Jordan, 439 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D. W. Va. 1977).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 522 F.2d 29, 31 (6th Cir. 1975).
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commentators and particularly defense counsel. Nevertheless, it is
relied upon by prosecutors in a rather remarkable number of cases. 8
The rationale normally given for the hearsay exception is Learned
Hand's view of the conspiracy as an agency relationship.
Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law
of evidence, but of the substantive law of crime. When
men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, and have made "a
partnership in crime." What one does pursuant to their
common purpose, all do, and, as declaratiOns may be such
acts, they are competent against all. 9
While this agency theory has been the subject of some considerable
criticism, 10 it remains the chief rationale for the exception and has
been consistently relied upon. 11 So long as the prosecution demonstrates that the co-conspirator declaration was made during the
course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy, the coconspirator's declaration is admissible. 12
The Federal Rules of Evidence

Federal Rule of Evidence 80l(d)(2)(E) essentially retains the
traditional elements of the co-conspirator's declaration exception.
The rule states, in material part, that such statements are admissible
if they are made "by a co-conspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 13 The major change in substance is that co-conspirator's declarations are now explicitly listed
by the rule as not being hearsay. 14 While defense counsel may well
argue that the elimination of the declaration as hearsay precludes
argument to the jury that such declarations are unbelievable and
8. See Criminal Agreement at 948.
9. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2nd Cir. 1926).
10. "The agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis
for admissibility beyond that already established." Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed
Federal Rules oJ Evidence, Commentary to§ 80l(d)(2)(E).
11. The rationale for both the hearsay-conspiracy exception and its limitations is the
notion that conspirators are partners in crime. As such, the law deems them agents of
one another. And just as the declarations of an agent bind the principal only when
the agent acts within the scope of his authority, so the declaration of a conspirator
must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in order to be admissible
against his partner. (Citations omitted)
Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974).
12. /d.
13. These elements have basically remained unchanged for decades. See generally, Levie,
Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. LAW REV. 1159 (1954).
14. This is as opposed to the procedural rules governing the admissibility of evidence,
such as questions to be resolved by the judge or jury, the quantum of evidence required, and so
forth. See, text accompanying notes 56-91, i'!fra.
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"rank hearsay", the courts apparently believe that no significant
change has been wrought by the rule. Judge Heaney made this point
very clearly in a recent case:
We recognize that Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E) provides that
a statement by the defendant's co-conspirator during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay.
The distinction between a statement which is not hearsay
and a statement which is an exception to the hearsay rule is
semantic and is not determinative of the outcome of this
case. 15
THE THREE COMPONENTS

Whether under the Federal Rules or not, declarations of co-conspirators are admissible against the defendant only if three elements
are satisfied: 1) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy 2) it was made during the course of the conspiracy and 3)
there is independent evidence to establish the conspiracy. 16 A good
deal has been written generally about the interplay of these three
elements and the nature of the evidence required to prove them. 17
At this point, however, I will tum to those issues which are currently
being pursued by prosecutors and defense counsel in connection
with the three elements.
The In Furtherance Requirement

Of the three elements, this requirement creates the least difficulty in actual practice. Despite some proposals for removing the in
furtherance requirement, Is the Supreme Court continues to rely on
iti 9 and the Federal Rules expressly retain it. In light of proposals to
eliminate the requirement, however, and Congress' rejection of such
proposals, a number of courts are beginning to take a closer look at
the in furtherance requirement in actual cases. Agreeing with one
commentator, these courts indicate that the Congressional action
"should be viewed as mandating a construction of the 'in furtherance' requirement protective of defendants . . . ."20
15. United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978).
16. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
17. See, e.g., C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE; WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE; PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE, supra.
18. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE rule 508(b) (1942) and United States v. Moore,
522 F.2d 1068, 1077 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975).
19. Anderson, supra n.16.
20. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra at 801-147, quoted in United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d
92, 100 (2d Cir. 1978).
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A recent Second Circuit analysis of the in furtherance requirement is illustrative of this protective stance. In United States v.
Lang,21 the defendant was arrested knowing full well he was in possession of counterfeit bills. The government, however, had to estab-

lish that he was in possession of the money with an intent to defraud.
The only proof offered by the government that the defendant intended to pass the money and hence defraud was a taped telephone
conversation between the defendant's supplier of the bills, Carey,
and an undercover agent. This conversation took place three days
after Lang's arrest. It consisted primarily of statements by Carey
that Lang had certain money with him when he was arrested. When
the government sought to introduce this conversation at trial
(through a tape recording of the conversation) it had to make it fall
within the co-conspirator declaration rule. Without the rule, the
statement would be inadmissible hearsay, being an out-of-court
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that
Lang had the money with him and thus was in the business of passing the money with intent to defraud.
The Second Circuit quite properly found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that this statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The government had argued that it was in
furtherance because it somehow "advanced the interest of the alleged conspiracy between Lang and Carey . . . that it was in Lang's
interest to have Carey in business."22 The problem with the government's argument, as the court found, was that Lang was under arrest
when the statement was made so that a conversation with the government agent could do nothing to advance any venture in which
Lang himself was concerned. Thus even if the statement could have
furthered a conspiracy that Carey was involved with, it was impossible to see how it could further a conspiracy that Lang was involved
with. Considering that there was no evidence that Lang had any
interest in any other business with Carey, and at most was involved
with the transaction for which he was arrested, the statement simply
was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. Without the statement,
there was no evidence that Lang was in business to make a profit and

hence its admission was reversible error.23
The Ninth Circuit also took a close look at the prosecution's in
furtherance argument within the past year. In United States v. Eu21. 589 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1978).
22. /d. at 100.
23. /d.
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banks, 24 the defendants were part of a drug distribution ring. One of
the members of the ring, the deceased Gonzales, was living in a common-law marriage relationship with the witness. This witness told at
trial of three sets of conversations involving the conspirators. The
first set included conversations between the conspirators which were
clearly in furtherance of the conspiracy because "they set in motion
transactions that were an integral part of the heroin distribution
scheme."25 The second set of conversations was more difficult.

These were conversations between the witness and Gonzales where
Gonzales told her of his plans to go to a city to pick up heroin for the
group. Because Gonzales was not attempting to persuade the witness to join the group at that time, the statement was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. It was "at best, nothing more that [a] casual
admission of culpability to someone he had individually decided to
trust." 26 The final declaration was the most difficult of all, as these
incriminating statements by Gonzales were made to the witness after
she had joined the conspiracy. Yet the court quite properly analyzed
the statements for what they were: simple statements to that woman
of the plans of the group and not statements designed to aid the ring.
Hence, her "participation in the conspiracy did not convert Gonzales' statements to her into declarations in furtherance of the conspiracy."27
The disposition of the government's arguments in Lang and
Eubank is a refreshing and tough review of the in furtherance requirement. While the statements in those cases were, without doubt,
generally connected with the conspiracy, they did not truly further
the conspiracy with which the defendants were associated. Hence,
despite the statements by some commentators that the in furtherance
language may be viewed "without much regard to whether [the statement] in fact furthered the conspiracy,"28 the adoption of the re24. 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979).
25. I d. at 520. In these conversations the conspirators discussed plans of the group regarding distribution of the heroin, such as the parties to handle the sales, some specific
purchases, etc.
26. Id., quoting United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 1975).
27. /d. The court went on to state:
There is no indication in the record that these statements were any more than conversations between conspirators that did nothing to advance the aims of the alleged conspiracy. The incriminating references to absent persons were not designed to induce
... [the woman's] continued participation in the conspiracy or to alfay her fears.
/d. at 521.
28. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE,§ 267 at 645 (2d Ed. 1972) quoted in United States v.
Moore, supra, 522 F.2d at 1077 n.5.
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quirement by Congress now makes clear that the requirement is to
be taken seriously indeed .
.During the Course

In recent years, there has been considerable activity at the trial
court level concerning the requirement that the declaration be made
during the course of the conspiracy. Most of this activity has been in
two particular types of cases: first, those conspiracies which are said
to have phases generally involving concealment and which therefore
continue after the primary objective of the argument has been met,
and second, those conspiracies where the government charges that
the conspiracies continued "up to and including the date of return of
the indictment."

The Supreme Court, in a series of three cases, established the
rule that there is not always a separate, implied conspiracy to conceal which survives the major conspiracy?9 This rule applies both
for purposes of the hearsay exception (whether the statement was
made during the course of the conspiracy) and for statute of limitations purposes. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan in the last of the
three cases:
By no means does this mean that acts of concealment can
never have significance in furthering a criminal conspiracy.
But a vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after
these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose
only of covering up after the crime.30
The Court was careful, however, to note that there are certain
kinds of cases which inherently involve concealment, 31 cases where
"the successful accomplishment of the crime necessitates concealment."32
The problem the courts have been grappling with in recent
years is identifying cases which inherently involve concealment and
which would therefore allow the conspiracy period to be extended.
29. The three cases are Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); and Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For
an excellent discussion of these issues as they relate to recent California law, see Oakley, From

Hearsay to Eternity: Pendency and the Co-conspirator Exception in Cal!fornia-Fact, Fiction,
and a Novel Approach, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. l (1975).
30. Gmnewald, 353 U.S. at 405.
31. The Court itself indicated that crimes inherently involving concealment would include kidnappers who were in hiding, waiting for ransom, or repainting a stolen car. 353 U S
at 405.
32. Jd.
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For instance, in United States v. .Del Valle, 33 the government proved
the existence of a widespread fraud ring involving an attorney, a secretary, an office manager, two runners, a practicing physician, and
that physician's secretary. Through various ploys these parties submitted fraudulent medical bills to insurance companies. The defendants were indicted for this offense soon after one of the
defendants, the attorney, had attempted to influence witnesses who
were to appear before a grand jury. At trial the government introduced testimony about the grand jury incidents and also offered the
attorney's statement made at that time. It justified this on the
ground that the statements were made during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Citing the Supreme Court cases, the
defendants argued that the act of the attorney in attempting to conceal the conspiracy was not a main part of the conspiracy and hence
was not during the course of it. The court rejected this reasoning,
finding that the nature of the conspiracy here was not aimed at accomplishing a single objective, but had a "continuing sequence of
objectives."34 Moreover, the declarant in this case was the attorney
who had, at least as part of his function, the role of protecting the
conspiracy "from those investigative agencies which threatened its
continuation." Therefore, the court concluded, his attempts to influence witnesses, and his statements at that time, were not acts of concealment related only to a past objective. "They were parts of
continuing activity that was essential to . . . the survival of an ongoing operation."35
The opinion in .Del Valle may well be sound as a means of construing the Supreme Court decisions on concealment. It was a farreaching conspiracy there, and the conspirators were on notice as to
the broad nature of the business. Nevertheless, the attorney's statements must certainly be approaching the outer limits of admissibility. While it was a wide-ranging conspiracy, there was no evidence
to indicate that individual members of the conspiracy had ever discussed or even foreseen that influencing witnesses before a grand
jury would be a part of the "concealment phase" of the conspiracy.
Indeed, it was not shown that the parties had agreed that the attorney would take it upon himself to further goals of the conspiracy by
engaging in any such activities. Still, because of the nature of the
operation, it is difficult to conclude that such activities were not dur33. 587 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1979).
34. Id. at 704.
35. Id.
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ing the course of the conspiracy. After all, this was a business whose
sole purpose was to engage in fraud. It is hard to believe that the
attorney, among others in the group, did not possess inherent powers
to do precisely what he did. Without such a large and sophisticated
operation, perhaps such activities would not be considered part of
the course of the conspiracy; in lJel Valle, however, the operation no
doubt contemplated precisely what took place-active concealment
of the defendants' crimes.
A similar situation is found in United States v. Mackey. 36 In
Mackey, a complicated scheme involving tax evasion and conspiracy
to evade taxes was charged. In addition, the government indictment
alleged that the conspiracy continued until the date of the filing of
the indictment. Testimony before a grand jury investigating the
scheme proved to be incriminating to a number of the conspirators.
This testimony was then offered at trial as an exception to Rule

80l(d)(2)(E). The court quite properly stated that whether or not
such statements were made during the duration of the conspiracy
would depend "upon the scope of the agreement entered into by its
members and is therefore dependent on the facts in each case.'m
In order to demonstrate that, as claimed, the conspiracy continued up to the time of the grand jury proceeding and indictment, the
government must use more than circumstantial evidence that some
conspirators attempted to cover up their illegal venture.38 In Mackey, strong proof of concealment was present. The scheme was a
broad effort to evade taxes, and that type of activity by its very nature required substantial concealment efforts. Moreover, because the
government's efforts at collecting taxes were continuing, the concealment efforts would have to be continuing as well. Finally, because
concealment of taxes was such an inherent part of evading the payment of taxes, the concealment phase of the conspiracy was during
the course of the major portion of the conspiracy. As a consequence,
the conspiracy did in fact exist up to the filing of the indictment and
statements to the grand jury were made during the course ofthe conspiracy.
The Mackey decision makes a good bit of sense in light of the
context of the opinion. It was a widespread operation involving, inherently, concealment. When one fails to pay taxes and attempts to
evade the payment of taxes, concealment is a necessary requirement.
36. 571 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978).
37. Id. at 383.

38. Id.
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Therefore, until the parties are arrested, unless there is some clear
break from the agre~ment, it would appear that the conspiracy does
continue. No broad rule can be taken from Mackey, however, regarding the continuation of the conspiracy up to the filing of an indictment. Simply because one conspirator attempts to cover up by
giving false testimony to the grand jury does not mean that such
concealment attempts are part of the conspiracy. Truly, the determination must be on a case-by-case method with close scrutiny given to
government claims that concealment is an inherent part of the conspiracy and continues to the time the indictment is returned.
Independent Evidence

The traditional rule has been that when the government at-

tempts to establish the existence of the conspiracy for the purpose of
proving the two elements of "in furtherance" and "during the
course," it must do so by using independent evidence other than the
hearsay declaration itself. 39 Without proof independent of the hearsay statement itself, "hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps
to the level of competent evidence."40 This rule of independent evidence has survived without change through most of the century.
After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however,
some courts doubted whether the independent evidence rule was still
viable. Chief among these courts was the First Circuit beginning
with United States v. Petrozziel/o.41 Because the Rules allowed the
question of admissibility in this area to be determined by the judge,42
the court penp.itted "a trial judge to base his 'determination' on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence."43 Without discussing the
point in detail, the court conceded that:
The use of inadmissible evidence to determine the existence
of a conspiracy seems to contradict the traditional doctrine
that conspiracy must be proved by independent nonhearsay
evidence. It suggests that a conspiracy may be proved by
the very statement seeking admittance. While the logic of
the new rul.e may _eermit bootstrapping of this sort, earlier
case law reJects It.
Before Petrozziello was decided, but after it had been argued,
39. The independent proof element is often referred to as "proof aliunde."
40. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
41.
42.
43.
44.
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the court heard argument in United States v. Martorano. 45 The court
indicated in Martorano that after the issuance of its opinion, it received a petition for rehearing which had been granted on the precise issue of whether the new Federal Rules altered the independent
evidence rule.46 The court relied heavily on the express language of
Rule 104(a) in reaffirming Martorano. This rule provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge,
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In makfug liis
determination he is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
In finding that the trial judge could "base his determination on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence, including perhaps the very
statement seeking admission," 47 the First Circuit once again recognized the impact of its holding on Glasser and the independent evidence rule generally. The court's conclusion as to this impact was as
follows:
The new rules, however, explicitly contemplate the consideration of such hearsay evidence in maKing preliminary
findings of fact. We believe the new rules must be taken as
overrUling Glasser to the extent that it held that the statement seeking admission cannot be considered in making
the determination whether a conspiracy exists.48
The First Circuit was not yet finished with this matter, because
it granted leave to file briefs on the issue of the independent evidence
rule. The court felt that the rule was "in some doubt," but it did not
have to face the question squarely because it found that, even under
the independent evidence rule, the statement was properly admissible.49 While seemingly stepping back from its earlier clear holding
concerning the overruling of Glasser, 50 the court did mention in its
final opinion that even if the statements were otherwise inadmissible,
"the question here is whether such reliable evidence may be considered by the district court in determining the preliminary fact whether
45. 557 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977).
46. Jd. n.•.
47. /d. at 11.
48. /d. at 12.
49. 561 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1977).
50. The court was careful not to express its views as a holding.
We emphasize that our opinions in this case should not be understood as deciding
anything about the continued viability of Glasser. We intend to have done no more
than indicate the basis for our doubts. Our decision in this case rests solely upon our
view that the "independent" evidence established the existence of a concerted mutual
venture.
I d. at 409.
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a conspiracy exists."51 This question was answered in the affirmative.
Unlike the First Circuit, other federal courts that have dealt
with the reliable evidence issue have answered the above question in
the negative. For the vast majority of courts, the independent evidence rule is still the law and the hearsay statement itself may not be
used by the trial judge in determining whether a conspiracy existed
or whether the declarant or the defendants were part of it. Most
circuit courts have been quite direct in disagreeing with the First Circuit's position. For instance, the Seventh Circuit remarked that it
remained "[m]indful of our duty to strictly scrutinize the sufficiency
of the nonhearsay evidence establishing the conspiracy's existence
and linking each defendant to it." 52 The Eighth Circuit was even
more direct:
We are aware that the First Circuit has recently suggested
by way of dictum that under Federal Rule of Evidence 104
the out-of-court statement itself may be considered by the
trial judge in determining its admissibility. . . . We feel

that this "bootstrapping" procedure is unwarranted and
was not contemplated m the enactment of Rule 104; we
thus adhere to our prior decisions requiring independent evidence of a conspiracy. 5 3 (emphasis in the original)
The most recent retention of the independent evidence rule is found
in the Fifth Circuit en bane decision in United States v. James. 54
Although Rule 104(a) provides that the court "is not bound
by the rules of Evidence except those with respect to privileges" we do not construe this language as permitting the
court to rely upon the content of the very statement whose
admissibility is at issue. We adhere to our requirement established in Apollo that fulfillment of the conditions of admissibility must be established by evidence independent of
the co-conspirator statement itself. This construction of
Rule 104(a) comports with earlier Supreme Court pronouncements that admissibility must depend upon independent evidence in order to prevent this statement from
"lift[ing] itself bv its own bootstraps to the level of competent evtdence." 55
Little pause is necessary in reaching agreement with the majority position. To use the conspirator statement itself in determining
51. Id. at 408.
52. United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 1977).
53. United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (1978).
54. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979). For further discussion of this case, see text accompanying note 66, infta.
55. 590 F.2d at 581.
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its admissibility is to render the conviction process meaningless. T)le

requirement of independent proof comes from a deep and very legitimate concern that the declaration may be unreliable but also exceedingly prejudicial to the defendant's case. Allowing the
statement itself to establish its own admissibility would result in effectively eliminating the defendant's ability to screen inappropriate
declarations in a good many cases. No policy can be served by such
a process.
TRIAL PROCEDURES FOR Co-CONSPIRATOR DECLARATIONS

We now begin an analysis of the trial procedures utilized in
connection with the co-conspirator declarations, the kinds of day-today issues attorneys actually face. Three particular procedural aspects of the problem have been drawn out: the standard of proof for
co-conspirator declarations; the order of proof in conspiracy cases;
and the question of whether it is the judge or the jury who determines the admissibility of the declarations.
Standard of Proof

For a long time prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence there was no consistent pattern in the courts concerning the
standard of proof for the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations. Circuits differed and panels within circuits differed.56 Since
the adoption of the Rules, though, the federal courts have been
somewhat more circumspect in their analysis of the standard.
Within the past several years, four primary standards have been
mentioned as the basis for admitting co-conspirator declarations. In

the 1976 edition of his widely respected treatise, Judge Weinstein
urged a very high standard indeed as a prerequisite for admission of
a co-conspirator declaration.
The better practice would be to require a very high degree
of proof before admitting the statement. Only if the court
is itself convinced beyond a reasonable doubt--considering
hearsay as well as non-hearsay evidence-of the conspiracy, defendant's membership, and that the statement was
made in furtherance thereof, should it admit.57
56. Indeed, in one case the Fourth Circuit noted that the " 'substantial, independent evidence' test . . . [is] expressed . . . in terms of 'prima facie proof of the conspiracy,' or proof by
a 'fair preponderance' of independent evidence." United States v. Strope, 538 F.2d 1063, 1065
(4th Cir. 1976).
57. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE {1976) ~ 104(05) at 104-44, as discussed in United States v.
Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978). See also, Bergman, The Co-conspirators Exception:
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This standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" would be nonsensical if applied to juries, yet many juries were given just that standard and told they would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that all elements of the conspiracy were present and that the defendant and the declarant were members of the group before the statement could be considered. 58 With the application of the standard to
judges,S9 the proposition makes a good deal more sense, particularly
in light of the widespread use of the hearsay exception. 60 No circuit
opinion has been found, however, adopting the reasonable doubt
standard for judge determinations. Most courts to consider the point
have agreed in essence with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Santiago. 61 There, the court rejected the reasonable doubt
standard, contending that the judge was ruling not on guilt or innocence but only on admissibility; hence, the government's burden
need not be so onerous. Moreover, even "on the issue of the voluntariness of a confession the Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey . . .
found that a preponderance of evidence was sufficient to permit the
introduction of the questioned confession." 62
The second standard suggested is a more troublesome one, finding its origin in dicta in the Supreme Court's famous decision in
United States v. Nixon. 63 In discussing the admissibility of subpoenaed tapes, the Court discussed, as an example of admissibility, declarations of co-conspirators. In a footnote the Chief Justice stated
that in such cases, "there must be substantial, independent evidence
of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury." 64
\Vhile most courts have not found this dicta to be binding on them in
co-conspirator cases, the Fifth Circuit adopted it fully in its recent en
bane decision in United States v. James. 65 In specifically relying on
Nixon the court reiterated that "as a preliminary matter, there must
be substantial, independent evidence of a conspiracy, at least enough
to take the question to the jury."66 (The court applied the emphasis.)
Apart from the fact that neither court has seriously defined such a
/Jefining the Standard of the Independent Evidence Test Under the New Federal Rules of E••i·
dence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99, 106-07 {1976).
58. See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir. 1979).
59. See text accompanying notes 82-92, infra.
60. See generally Criminal Agreement, supra.
61. 582 F.2d I 128 (7th Cir. 1978).
62. /d. at 1135. See a/so United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
63. 418 u.s. 683 (1974).
64. /d. at 701 n. 14.
65. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979).
66. ld. at 581.
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standard, one difficulty with it is its lack of true historical definition
or application. The court in James stated that it is more appropriate
to adopt a substantial evidence rule than one which requires a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear
what the requirements of the substantial evidence standard are, nor
how it differs from other standards of proof.
Most courts to consider the standard of proof question have not
followed the Fifth Circuit. Rather, these courts have held either that
there must be sufficient evidence of a prima facie case or that there
must be proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence.
As to the application and definitions of these two standards, it is generally conceded that the prima facie standard is a lesser requirement.
The requirement of prima facie proof is less stringent than
that of a preponderance of the evidence. The former requires oniy enough evidence to take the question to the
jury, whereas the latter requires "proof which leads the jury
to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence".67
Despite this lower quantum of proof, or perhaps because of it,
relatively few courts have adopted the prima facie evidence test. 68
Without question, the most popular standard to be applied, by an
overwhelming majority of the circuits, is the standard which allows
the declaration to be heard by the jury if the judge finds that the
conspiracy and the declarant's and the defendant's part in it were
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.69
Although the prima facie standard is no longer appropriate, we see no reason to require that a conspiracy be proved
beyond a reasonable douot. That is the standard tlie jury
will apply to the evidence as a whole. The judge is ruling
on admissibility, not guilt or innocence; the government's
burden need not be so ~reat. The ordinary civil standard is
sufficient; if it is more likely than not the declarant and the
defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay
statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of a conspiracy, the hearsay is admissible. 70
67. United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 812 n. 8 (3rd Cir. 1976).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978): United States v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978).
70. Petrozziel/o, supra, 548 F.2d at 23. For a good discussion of this point, see Saltzburg.
Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STANFORD L. REv. 271. 303-04
(1975).
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Order of Proof
In most jurisdictions, the order of proof rule was consistent regardless of whether the judge or jury determined the admissibility of
the declaration. The co-conspirator declaration could be received in
evidence "subject to being connected up." That is, the jury could be
instructed that admissibility had not yet been resolved and the declaration was simply offered at an early point in the trial for clarity in
the prosecution's case. Of course, if the declaration was not connected up, i.e., if it was later found that the statement was inadmissible, the testimony could be stricken or the judge could grant a
motion for a mistrial.71 In only the rarest of cases was the broad
discretion of the trial judge to deal with the order of proof in the coconspirator· declaration situation seriously challenged.72 With the
advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, some courts began to question the broad discretionary power regarding the order of
proof. The most striking example of this is found in the Fifth Circuit's panel and en bane decisions in United States v. James. 13
While the panei decision by Judge Tuttle recognized the broad
discretion in proof generally available under the Federal Rules of
Evidence/4 the court concluded that the trial judge could not admit
a conspirator's declarations until the judge had determined that the
government had made the required "threshold showing."
[T]he judge cannot allow the jury to hear a co-conspirator's
declaration until he has determined admissibility oy a pre-

ponderance of the evidence. If the prosecution should seek
to introduce a co-conspirator's declaration early in the trial,
sufficient evidence to support the threshold finding may not
have come in. Thus, tl:ie government must either develop
its proof of conspiracy and the defendant's and the declarant's connection with it before tendering a co-conspirator's
statement or make such proof at an extra jury hearing. 75
71. See generally, Apollo v. United States, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973).
72. See discussion in PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, Sllpra, at § 5.05(3](bj.
73. 'The panel decision is reported at 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978). The en bane decision
is reported at 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979).
74. Rule 61 I(a) provides: "The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order ofinterrogating witnesses in presenting evidence so as to {I) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of proof, (2) avoid consumption of time, and (3)
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."
75. 576 F.2d at 1131. The court's mention of the "extra jury hearing" led to considerable
fears in the Fifth Circuit of required pre-trial hearings on the admissibility of a conspirator's
declaration. As indicated below, however, the en bane decision obliterated any "requirement"
for extra jury hearings.
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Judge Tuttle was most concerned with the prejudicial impact on the
jury of the common "connecting up" situation. As he stated,
[T]he judge would have to instruct the jury to perform the
intellectually difficult task of deciding the case while disregarding preJudicial evidence of strikfug relevance ...76
The court en bane reconsidered this strict order of proof ruling.
In an opinion by Judge Clark, the full court conceded "the danger to
a defendant in a conspiracy trial when the government tenders a coconspirator's statement before laying the foundation for its admission.'m The court backed away, however, from the panel's ruling.
Instead, it discussed a "preferred order of proof."
The district court should, whenever reasonably practicable,
require the showing of a conspiracy and of the connection
of the defendant With it before admitting declarations of a
co-conspirator. If it determines it is not reasonably .Practical to require the showing to be made before admittmg the
evidence, the court may admit the statement subject to being connected up. 78
The en bane court's decision makes a good deal of sense. It
seeks to avoid the connecting up problem whenever possible, but
leaves enough discretion for the trial judge to allow the early statement in a complex matter where the sequence of testimony may well
be highly important. Even this preferred order of proof, rather than
the required one in the panel decision, goes well beyond the usual
order of proof procedure adopted by most courts after the Federal
Rules. Most courts still talk in terms of "the procedure of provisionally admitting a co-conspirator's statements."79 Because it allows for
discretion, while encouraging the elimination of serious prejudice in
many cases, the "preferred order of proof' standard set out in James
as well as elsewhere should be widely adopted. 80
76. /d.
77. 590 F.2d at 581.
78. /d. at 582.
79. United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 1978).
80. The new rule requiring a specific determination of the existence of a conspiracy
by the court on the record does not alter the traditional discretion of the trial judge to
allow the government to place the statement into evidence on the condition that it be
later shown by sufficient independent evidence that a conspiracy existed. It is preferable whenever possible that t.h~ government's indepef!dent. proof of t~e consP.ir.acy_ be
introduced first, thereby avotdmg the danger, recogmzed m Petrozzrel/o, of mJectmg
the record with inadmissible hearsay in anticipation of proof of a conspiracy which
never materializes. (citation omitted)
United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.3 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Admissibility, A Judge or Jury Question?
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, the circuits were divided on the question of who was to determine the admissibility of
co-conspirator declarations. Some courts took the position that the
judge alone would determine the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations. As stated by Judge Friendly, it is "for the judge to determine whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant
against whom the declarations were offered had engaged in a 'concerted mutual venture' with the declarant." 31 Other courts, however,
followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit and allowed for participation
by the jury. As explained by the Fifth Circuit in James:
[T]he judge's role is to make a preliminary determination
whether the government has presented sufficient evidence,
independent of the hearsay itself, to support a finding by
the jury that the alleged conspiracy existed and that the declarant and the defendant against whom the statement is
offered were members of that conspiracy . . . .
If the judge is satisfied that this test has been met, then
under existing law the jury is instructed, both when the
hearsay is introduced and at the final charge, that it max
consider the hearsay against a particular defendant only If
it first finds that the conspiracy existed, that the declarant
and the defendant were members of it, and that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of
the conspiracy. 82
.
With the adoption of the Rules, the debate on the subject became more precise and pronounced. Rule 104, in particular, was the
focal point for discussion.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary
questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination
1t is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of
the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing ofjury. Hearings on the admissibility of
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hear81. United States v. Geaney, 4I7 F.2d I ll6, I ll9 (2d Cir. I969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S.
I028 (I970).
82. 590 F.2d at 578, citing Apollo, supra.
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ing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters
shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require
or, when an accused be a witness, if he so requests.
Because Rule 801, which defines the co-conspirator declaration
principle, gives no guidance with respect to whether the judge or the
jury determines admissibility, Rule 104 becomes the key. Yet, viewing the precise language of Rule 104 also offers little guidance. As
explained in some detail by Judge Weinstein, this admissibility problem could legitimately be seen as falling within either subsection (a)
or subsection (b), depending on the characterization of the problem;
the admissibility question could then be resolved by either the judge
or the jury.
The problem can, on the one hand, be characterized as a
matter of competence of the evidence-i.e., is the
probability of its reliability sufficiently great to make it admissible? Viewed from this perspective the/reliminary issue of the existence of the conspiracy an the objecting
defendant's part in it are questions for the judge to decide
like any other question of hearsay or privilege.
But, on the other hand, the issue can be framed in relevancy terms where the question of admissibility turns on
the relevancy of the evidence. Thus declarations of a coconspirator, while often interesting, are largely irrelevant to
any Issue of defendant's guilt unless he is first shown to be
connected with the conspiracy. Preliminary questions regarding relevance are frequently held to be for the jury after the introduction of sufficient evidence to justify a jury
finding the existence of the preliminary fact.
This discussion is directly on point. One can forcefully argue that
co-conspirator declarations raise the greatest question of reliability;
therefore, a judge ought to hear the issue. Yet one can also argue
that because the existence of the conspiracy must first be proven, the
relevancy of this evidence depends on a condition of fact; therefore,
it is a matter for a jury, with proper instructions as previously done
in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere. 84
Some commentators have argued rather strenuously that the
jury should retain its involvement in the admissibility questions for
co-conspirator declarations. As is pointed out in the McCormick
Treatise,85 the conspiracy findings appear to be in the traditional
83. M. BERGER and J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, ~ 104[5) at 104-40 (1975), as
discussed in James, supra, 576 F.2d at 1128-29.
84. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
85. C. McCORMICK HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 2nd Ed. §53 at 19 (Supp.
1978).

305

AM.

J. CRIM.

LAW

Vol. 7:287 (1979)

mold of findings to be determined by the jury:
More specifically, under the Federal and revised Uniform
Rules, oeclarations of co-conspirators are expressedly removed from the category of hearsay and are placed in the
nonhearsay category of admissions. Thus rather than being

a "technical" question of hearsay, the preliminary question
is analogous to other cases of vicarious admissiOns. Was
there an agency (conspiracy with defendant and declarant
as members), and did the agent (declarant member of the
conspiracy) make the statement? The questions are the
kind that traditionally has been submitted to juries after a
preliminary screening by the trial judge, as set forth in Rule
104(b), and this view finds substantial support in recent decisions. This solution .is consistent witli the commonly
stated requirement that the existence of the conspiracy be
established by "independent" evidence and lays at rest any
uneasiness lest the foundation be furnished by the "hearsay" statement itself, since under Rule 104(b) the rules of
evidence are applicable. (Footnotes omitted)
Additionally, another commentator has taken the position that
to apply Rule 104(b), retaining the jury's involvement, would actually aid the defendant.
The revisionist's concern about the confusion and futility of asking the jury to twice decide the same fact is similarly an insufficient basis to justify taking the issue from
the JUry. As already indicated, this is no more futile than
telling the jury to ignore testimony that has been stricken.
But a far more important reason exists for submitting both
preliminary and ultimate issues to the jury, despite the possible futility of the act. By charging the jury tliat they may
not consider the co-conspirator statements until they have
found independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy,
the policy that led to the existence of this corroboration requirement is fulfilled. The charge communicates to the

jury the reluctance that exists, as a matter of law, in crediting this evidence. It tells them that the courts recognize its
potential unreliability. It alerts them to the danger of unouly trusting the statements. 86
Despite these contentions, the courts which have evaluated the
argument have rejected the Rule 104(b) analysis and have instead
indicated that the judge alone is to make determinations with regard
to the declaration's admissibility. 87 This article adopts that view. As
86. Kessler, The Treatment ofPreliminary Issues ofFact in Conspiracy Litigations: Pulling
the Conspiracy Back in the Co-conspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 96 (1976).
87. The circuits are cited in the 1978 edition of WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE. For a representative sample, see, United States v. Petrozziello, supra; United States v. Santiago, supra;
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the Fifth Circuit in James pointed out, "[A] rule that puts the admissibility of co-conspirator statements in the hands of the jury does not
avoid the danger that the jury might convict on the basis of these
statements without first dealing with the admissibility questions." 88
The kinds of questions encompassed by Rule 104(b) should be questions which do not pose the danger of substantial prejudice to the
defendant. Yet, conspiracy declarations are the kind which ought
not to be considered on a preliminary basis by the jury.
The admissibility of a co-conspirator's declarations in a
conspiracy trial, however, does pose problems precisely because they are relevant. Such evidence endangers the integrity of the trial because the relevancy and apparent
probative value of the statements may be so highly prejudicial as to color other evidence even in the mind of a conscientious juror, despite instructions to disregard the
statements or to consider them conditionally. As a result,
such statements should be evaluated by the trained legal
mind of the trial judge.89
The problem in allowing the jury to engage in the traditional
two-step analysis of admissibility is that jurors may well be swept up
by the enormity and prejudicial impact of the statement and may use
the hearsay statement itself to prove the guilt of the defendant initially. Considering the vast number of cases in which the declaration
problem arises90 and the heavy emphasis placed on it by prosecutors,
the risk of serious and adverse impact on the jury will always be
present in declaration cases, no matter who determines admissibility.
While the risk will not be avoided in all cases, particularly where the
traditional order of proof principle is retained, it can be lessened
greatly by looking to the judge rather than to the jury to make the
admissibility determination.91
United States v. Macklin, supra; United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 377 (6th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied 434 U.S. 925; United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979).
88. 590 F.2d at 579.
89. /d.
90. See, Criminal Agreement, supra.
91. See, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1978) ~ 104[05], 104-40:
To ask the jurors to consider highly prejudicial statements of co-conspirators only if
they first find the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it, is
to present them with too tricky a task. In cases where the conspiracy is charged, it
creates the absurdity of asking the jury in effect to decide the issue of guilt before it
may consider evidence which is probative of guilt. Giving these preliminary questions to the jury violates the spirit of rule 104, which calls for preliminary determinations by the judge in all cases involving a high potential for prejudice.

307

AM.

J.

CRIM. LAW

Vol. 7:287 (1979)

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ISSUE

"The Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront wit·
nesses against him is a fundamental right . . . made obligatory on
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." 92 The Sixth Amendment
dictates that only reliable evidence be aqmitted against the defend·
ant; hence, the right of cross examination of witnesses is of paramount importance. 93 The reliability question is particularly difficult
with co-conspirators' statements, since the impact on the defense
case may be quite prejudicial although there is no opportunity to
confront the original declarant. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did
not discuss the basic issue until 1970 when it decided the case of
.Dutton v. Evans. 94
In .Dutton, a four Justice plurality, (the Chief Justice and Jus-

tices White and Blackman, with Justice Stewart writing the opinion)
held that the admission of hearsay declarations of co-conspirators
did not, by themselves, violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause. While conceding that both the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rule "stem from the same roots," 95 the Court concluded that
the two were not the same and ought not to be treated the same for
constitutional purposes. Thus, even though the declaration would
not have been admissible in the federal courts,96 the Sixth Amendment would not necessarily be violated. The hearsay rules and the
confrontation clause were similar in origin, but not identical in application. Without setting forth any clear rule for future adjudication of the problem, the Court's opinion focused on whether the
evidence was crucial to the prosecution's case or devastating to the
92. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (197tl), quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965),
which had applied the confrontation clause to the states.
93. See generally Davenport, 17ze Co'!frontation ClaliSe and the Co-conspirator Exception
in Criminal ProseCtJtion: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. Rev. 1378, 1379 (1972).
94. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The other major confrontation clause case of recent years is
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, however, the question centered on the
confrontation challenge to the use in a joint trial of a co'!ftssion of one of the co-defendants.
Thus, the legal issues were quite different from those involved herein. For a broad discussion
of Bruton, see PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, Sllpra, at § 5.06.
95. 400 U.S. at 86.
96. The Court stated in .Dullon, id. at 81:
It is settled that in federal conspiracy trials the hearsay exception that allows
evidence of an out-of-court statement of one conspirator to be admitted against his
fellow conspirators applies only if the statement was made in the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and not during a subsequent period when the conspirators were engaged in nothing more than concealment of the criminal enterprise.
The hearsay exception that Georgia applied in the present case, on the other hand,
permits the introduction of evidence of such out-of-court statement even though
made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy. (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the concealment phase problem, see, text accompanying notes 29-39, supra.
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defendant. 97 Because the declaration was not that vital, and because
there were "indicia of reliability" demonstrating that the statement
should be placed before the jury, confrontation of the original declarant was not required. 98
Dutton raised a good many problems which continue to plague
the courts. Preliminarily, it is not clear what the holding is, for the
opinion in Dutton was a plurality opinion, Justice Harlan joining the
majority but writing a separate opinion. 99 In addition, there is genuine confusion concerning the problem of the availability of a witness
who does not testify, 100 and the question of whether the trial court
must make findings with regard to whether the declaration was crucial to the government case or devastating to the defense remains
unanswered. 101
In this article, however, attention will be focused on one relatively narrow question left open after Dutton, a question which is
raised more often than any other confrontation issue in the federal
courts. In .Dutton, the Court was faced with evidence which clearly
violated the federal co-conspirator exception, yet it allowed the evidence in considering the facts in that case. Does compliance with the
federal exception establish that the confrontation clause has been
"automatically" satisfied? The circuit courts have split in answering
this question, and the Supreme Court in the period since Dutton has
given no guidance. There are courts which take the position that
compliance with the federal hearsay exception rule constitutes a per
se validation under the confrontation clause. The Sixth Circuit very
recently stated this without hesitation.
Where evidence comes within this exception, the confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment is not violated,
even if a statement clearly implicates the defendant and the
declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. 102
Some courts do not even seriously address the question, simply con97. This is a point well discussed by Davenport, supra, who attempts to formulate principles to govern the cases in this area.
98. 400 U.S. at 87.
99. Justice Harlan took a very limited view of the confrontation clause.
In general, he would strictly limit the role of the confrontation clause to a literal right
of the defendant to be present and cross-examine those "witnesses" who actually
testify against him, i.e., not the declarants, but only the witnesses through whom the
declarations are presented in court. Questions of abuse would then be left to the care
of the due process clause, which he found unnecessary to invoke in Dullon.
Davenport, supra, 85 Harv. L. Rev. at 1380 n. 18.
100. Compare the panel opinion in Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), with the en
bane decision, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1975) cerl. denied 423 U.S. 824.
101. See generally United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099 (2nd Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 414

u.s. 844.

102. United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164, 170 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1978).
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eluding that the confrontation argument is "frivolous" 103 or "clearly
without merit.'; 104 While some of these opinions do discuss the potential for unusual circumstances which might raise confrontation
questions, 105 there is a strong adherence to a "per se rule permitting
the use of properly admissible extra-judicial statements of a co-conspirator who did not take the stand at trial without risk of a reversal
for violation of his co-defendant's right to confrontation." 106
Other courts, however, have been very concerned both with the
confrontation clause rationale itself as well as the broad reaches of
the Court's opinion in JJutton. The Second Circuit's recent five year
odyssey in this area is instructive. In United States v. Puco, 101 the
panel, in an opinion by Judge Feinberg, concluded that compliance
with the traditional exception did not constitute per se compliance
with the confrontation clause. Instead, the court discussed the mean-

ing of .Dutton and explored the questions of whether there were indicia of reliability and whether the co-conspirator's statement was
"devastating" or "crucial". 108 When the government petitioned for a
rehearing by the panel, Judge Feinberg clarified the opinion by stating that the district judge would not have to make a finding of
whether the declaration was crucial to the government or devastating
to the defendant before admitting the declaration. Nevertheless, according to Judge Feinberg, the government read "too little into JJutton." He concluded that "ignoring the implications of .Dutton . . .
[was] unwarranted and unwise." 109 Judge Lumbard, on the other
hand, dissented from the opinion in Puco and himself cast doubt on
the panel's opinion "casting doubt upon the rule regarding the ad103. United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1362 (5th Cir. 1978). In fairness to the Fifth
Circuit, the precise question there was whether Rule 80I(d)(2){E) was unconstitutional because
it violates the confrontation clause. The more difficult question is not whether the rule itself
violates the clause, but whether in a given case evidence admitted under it would violate the
confrontation clause. Nevertheless, Johnson has been seen by other circuits as following the
automatic rule of compliance with the confrontation clause if the federal rule is satisfied. See,
e.g., United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
104. Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 409 U.S.
1128 (1973).
105. United States v. Hynes, 560 F.2d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 1977). Interestingly enough, the
court in Hynes cited one of its earlier opinions for the automatic or per se rule, United States v.
Kelley, 526 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1975). Yet the court in Kelley• actually stated that it construed
.Dullon "as requiring a case-by-case analysis in determining whether the application of an
exception to the hearsay rule complies with the confrontation clause." Kelley at 620.
106. United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977). See also, United States
v. Montgomery, 582 F.2d 514, 518-19 (lOth Cir. 1978).
107. 476 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 844.
108. Id. at 1104.
109. Id. at 1107.
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mission of co-conspirator's statements." 110 Moreover, he was most
concerned that the circuit was taking a position on this important
issue without "positive en bane approval of a majority of the active
judges of the circuit." 111 The entire court denied rehearing en bane
and little else was heard on this point from the Second Circuit. 112
Within the past year, however, that court, in an opinion by Judge
Smith, made clear that Puco was good law and "that .Dutton mandates a case-by-case examination to determine whether the defendant's right of confrontation has been abridged." 113
The Ninth Circuit, one of the circuits to reject the automatic
compliance rule, has been particularly vigilant in its review of the
confrontation clause challenge. For instance, in United States v.
Snow, 114 the court explored in some detail the confrontation question, looked to four important factors from .Dutton which were indicative of reliability, 115 and carefully weighed the arguments of both
parties. As that court later succinctly stated:
The court must determine whether cross-examination of
the declarant would be likely to show that the declarant's
statements were unreliable. Another important determination is whether the evidence is "crucial" or "devastating" to
the defense. 116
Like Judge Feinberg, this article would emphasize that the "automatic compliance" circuits read too little into .Dutton. To be sure,
they tend to focus only on that portion of .Dutton which indicates
that "merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a longestablished hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion
that confrontation rights have been denied." 117 As the Court in .Dutton noted, however, this was only the converse of an equally correct
proposition.
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and
110. /d. at 1109.
Ill. /d. at 1110.
112. Only Judges Friendly, Hays, Timbers and Mansfield dissented from the court's order.
113. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
114. 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090.
115. The court set forth four factors indicative of reliability:
(I) the declaration contained no assertion of a past fact, and consequently carried a
warning to the jury against giving it undue weight; (2) the declarant had personal
knowledge of the identity and role of participants in the crime; (3) the possibility that
the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection was remote; and (4) the circumstances under which the statements were made did not provide reason to believe that
the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime.
/d. at 734.
116. l)nited States at Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 772 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States v.
Wood, 550 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1976).
117. 400 U.S. at 82, citing, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the
overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is
nothirig more or less than a codification of the rules of
hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law. Our decisions have never established such a
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of c01!(rontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay
exception. (emphasis added) 118
This statement is absolutely to the point. Simply because the
hearsay exception has been complied with does not mean that the
confrontation clause could not be violated. For instance, in a situation where the co-conspirator exception was satisfied but the declaration was crucial to the prosecution's case, devastating to the defense,
and there were some indicia of unreliability, it is shocking to think
that there could not be a serious confrontation clause question.
While it is highly unlikely that there will be many cases in which the
hearsay exception will be satisfied but the confrontation clause will
be violated, 119 this does not speak in support of the automatic compliance rule. There are a good many rules of law governing situations which arise only rarely. Nevertheless, they are rooted in the
sound principle that in a given case the violation may be proved and
118. I d. The Supreme Court continues to make the point very clearly that, while the Confrontation Clause principles and the hearsay rules overlap, they are hardly identical. Green v.
Georgia,- U.S.-, 99 S.Ct. 2150 (1979), for example, involved a twist on the usual siutation.
A first trial resulted in a jury verdict of guilty. At a second trial, to decide whether capital
punishment would be imposed, defendant Green sought to introduce the testimony of a witness who had repeated the incriminating words of the co-defendant at the first trial. This
testimony would have shown both that the co-defendant had committed the murder and that
Green had not been present at the time of the killing. Because Georgia does not recognize
declarations against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule, the testimony was not
admissible. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of the testimony violated the defendant's due process rights. The testimony was relevant, reliable and quite significant. Indeed, it
had been used against the co-defendant at his own trial since confessions are admissible
against the declarant. Quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, (1973), the Court
noted, "The Hearsay Rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the end ofjustice" and
vacated the defendant's sentence. He had been denied a fair trial on the issue of punishment
because of the exclusion of testimony which was hearsay and which did not come within the
state's recognized exceptions. (See, dissent of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, -U.S. at-, 99 S Ct. at
2152.)
119. But see United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 521 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1979):

In holding Gonzales' statements inadmissible under Rule 80l(d)(2)(E), we are
mindful of the fact that a contrary holding would raise serious questions about
whether appellants were denied their Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by the
introduction of the Gonzales' statements. This court has recognized that
"[a]dmissibility under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule does not ...
automatically demonstrate compliance with the confrontation clause." (Citations
omitted).
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may be substantial. Moreover, when the hearsay rule is coupled
with evidentiary problems such as the so-called "slight evidence"
rule, 120 further connected to complicity liability for conspirators 121
and the lax standard for admissibility of conspiracy declarations, 122
it is difficult indeed to justify the automatic compliance rule.
While specific rules or principles are difficult to set forth in this
area, the more difficult, yet satisfying, case-by-case analysis to determine if "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement" 123 seems preferable. Perhaps the best
analysis of the factors to be utilized here was set out by the Tenth
Circuit in the United States v. Roberts. 124 The court indicated eight
factors which are relevant in determining whether the confrontation
clause has been violated. While these factors are hardly exhaustive
of those which. can be considered, they are most useful in analyzing
the problem.
[The Court should consider:] (1) what opportunity
the jury had to evaluate the credibility of the declarant, (2)
whether the statements were crucial to the government's
case or devastating to the defense, (3) the declarant's
knowledge of the identities and roles of the other co-conspirators, (4) whether the extrajudicial statements might be
founded on faulty recollection, (5) whether the circumstances under which the statements were made provide reason to believe the declarant misrepresented defendant's
involvement in the crime, (6) whether the statements were
120. "It is well settled that 'where the existence of a conspiracy is shown . . . only slight
additional evidence is required to connect a particular dqendant with it'." United States v. Lawson, 523 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1975). Citing United States v. McGann, 431 F.2d 1104, 1107
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 919 (1971) (emphasis in original). Unique among the
circuits, the Fifth Circuit, formerly one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the slight evidence rule, has finally eliminated the use of the rule entirely. United States v. Malatesta, 590
F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1979). The slight evidence rule normally is used to prove the connection of
the defendant as a general matter. It can, however, also be used to establish his connection for
purposes of showing the admissibility of a co-conspirator's declaration. For a good discussion
of this point, see, Note, Connecting Dqendants to Conspiracies: The Slight Evidence Rule and
the Federal Courts, 64 VA. L. REv. 881, 889-892 (1978); United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138,
1141 (9th Cir. 1977).
121. Under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) the co-conspirator is liable for
all substantive offenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy, even if these offenses were not
discussed, so long as they were foreseeable.
122. The standard for admissibility is, obviously, considerably less than the usual reasonable doubt standard. The normal such standard, as discussed supra, is a preponderance of the
evidence or proof of a prima facie case.
123. California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 161.
124. 583 F.2d 1173 (lOth Cir. 1978). As the court in Roberts noted, "simply pigeonholing
evidence into a recognized exception is insufficient to show compliance with the confrontation
clause." Id. at 1176.
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ambiguous (7) what limiting jury instructions, if any, were
given, (8) whether prosecutorial misconduct was present,
etc.I2s
THE SCOPE OF THE CONSPIRACY, "RICO TO THE RESCUE: THE
ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY" 126

One of the most difficult tasks the prosecution faces in a complex conspiracy trial is proving the breadth of a single conspiracy or
the number of agreements involved in the criminal activities. In recent years many important issues have been raised surrounding this
problem of defining the scope of the agreement. For instance, there
is the question of whether a defendant can be charged with two separate conspiracy counts for becoming a member of a single conspiracy
which violated two specific drug conspiracy statutes. 127 Also, there
was some question as to the ability of Congress to define a single
group endeavor as both a conspiracy offense and a substantive offense.128 Because these problems bear on the hearsay exception
problem in only a collateral manner, 129 the discussion here will
125. /d. at 1176. Interestingly enough, the Tenth Circuit was also the court to decide the
Montgomery "automatic compliance" case discussed, supra.
126. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978).
127. The early cases on this point prohibited double prosecutions finding that such a result
was compelled by Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). See United States v. Adcock, 487 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974), cerl.
denied, 421 U.S. 948. The more recent cases allow this double prosecution, focusing on the
intent of Congress to deal harshly with the drug traffic. See United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d
943 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marotta, 518 F. 2d 681 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Gamer, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978). This rationale was sharply criticized by Judge Rubin in
United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1251 (5th Cir. 1978). The rule in the Fifth Circuit
may be subject to change in light of the order by the court to have Rodriguez reheard en bane.
128. The problem arose because of§ 1955 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
which was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770
(1975). The question in Iannelli was not so much the scope or application of§ 1955, as is
common in the RICO situation, but whether the defendant could be charged with violating
both§ 1955 (dealing with illegal gambling business) and the general conspiracy section,§ 371.
In essence, the defendant argued that by definition § 1955 required a conspiracy; hence he
could not be charged twice for the same offense. The Court rejected this argument and found
that convictions for both a conspiracy to violate § 1955 and a § 1955 violation were proper.
129. They do bear on the question, however, and often in a most important way. For
instance, in the situation involving dual drug conspiracies, if the prosecutor charges the de·
fendant with violating a specific conspiracy statute, such as conspiracy to import, certain indi·
viduals who were in that conspiracy (e.g., a middle-man on the importation side) may be co·
conspirators for purposes of the exception. If, on the other hand, the defendant is only charged
with conspiracy to distribute, the statement of the importer co-conspirator may not be admissible against the defendant in that distribution conspiracy. The statement would not be admissi·
ble because it was not in furtherance of the deftndanl's group. If, instead, the defendant is
charged with two conspiracy violations-importation and distribution-the statement would
be admissible for it would have been made in furtherance of one of the conspiracies, the con·
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center on a scope problem which is the other side of the coin from
these questions. The question here is not whether a single agreement
can be divided up for prosecution or punishment purposes. Rather,
the issue is whether several seemingly separate agreements can be
charged together as one conspiracy. As a practical matter, this scope
question can be of great significance to the application of the coconspirator declaration role. If numerous conspiracies can be
charged together as a single all-encompassing agreement, the words
of one conspirator as to a portion of that activity are admissible
against all members of all portions of the conspiracy. 130
Traditionally the issues surrounding the joinder of seemingly
separate conspiracies as a single one have confounded courts in general and the Supreme Court in particular. The courts have spent a
good deal of time trying to analyze the single conspiracy argument in
terms of whether the criminal activity fell within the so-called
wheeP 31 or chain conspiracies. 132 While the problems surrounding
the spokes and chains have hardly disappeared and indeed may well
be plaguing the lower courts more than ever, 133 few new legal developments in recent years have shed light on an appropriate judicial
response. Rather, the problem continues as one of definition and
proof at trial.

This relatively static nature of things is to be contrasted with a
very major, and very recent, development found under the guise of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly
spiracy to import. This is true, even though the declarant's activities are exactly the same in
both cases: he is simply the middle-man.
130. And, of course, the more wide reaching the conspiracy and the more distant the codefendants, the less able the defendant is to rebut effectively the co-conspirators' declarations.
13 I. A wheel conspiracy is present when a single individual (or individuals), the hub, deals
with various other parties engaging in criminal transactions. The wheel is complete, and thus
a single large conspiracy can be proved when the groups, the spokes, who deal with the one
moving force, know that other participants exist and know that their involvement is criminal.
The major Supreme Court decision in this area is Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750
(1946).
132. A chain conspiracy is present when there is a criminal operation involving a distribution system in which parties at one end of the system pass materials to parties at the other end.
The various parties to the transaction are "links" in the conspiracy, and thus can be joined in a
single large conspiracy, if they are aware of the general enterprise and their involvement in it.
The most famous chain conspiracy case is not a Supreme Court decision at all. It is the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
133. For excellent judicial discussion of wheels and chains, see the Fifth Circuit's decisions
in United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974). See also Note, Federal Treatment ofMultiple
Conspiracies, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 387 {1957).
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known as RICO. 134 In the decade in which RICO has been alive, 135
and particularly in the past several years, the courts have had to
come to grips with a marked change in the analysis of the single
conspiracy theory.
The substantive portion of the RICO statute is straightforward.
Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.
The key words in the provision are defined with clarity in other portions of the statute. An enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."136 Racketeering activity consists of any act or threat involving
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, narcotics vi-

olations, and most interstate commerce violations. 137 A pattern of
racketeering activity merely means "two acts of racketeering activity."138 Given the broad definitions, it truly appears that, in passing
RICO, Congress attempted to deal a telling and unobstructed blow
to organized crime. Still, the difficulties in the RICO prosecutions
have not generally involved violations of the substantive RICO provision but rather of the section that allows for conviction for having
conspired to violate the substantive section. 139 This point is made
especially clear in what is probably the most far reaching interpretation of RICO, United States v. Elliott. 140
In E!fiott, two brothers, J.C. and Recea Hawkins, were convicted of a substantive violation of RICO, § 1962(c). The substantive violation was easily affirmed because, as the court properly
found, under the defendant's "loose organization" J.C. was the
"chairman of the board" and Recea was, at minimum, part of an
"executive committee" which arranged for the theft and distribution
of numerous stolen commodities. Even though the criminal en134. 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.
135. Congress enacted the statute in 1970.
136. § 1961(4).
137. § 1961(1).
138. § 1961{5).
139. § 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section."
140. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
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deaver here was a "myriapod criminal network" 141 it was a connected network dealing in everything from arson to car theft to
murder to narcotics transactions to theft of interstate commercial
goods. No, the problem with the Elliott case was not that two of the
major principals were charged on an enterprise theory. Instead, the
problem was that the government also used a conspiracy charge for
other participants.
With regard to the conspiracy argument, the defendant's contention was the usual one made in this area: "[W]hile the indictment
alleged but one conspiracy, the government's evidence at trial
proved the existence of several conspiracies." 142 In this particular
case, the impact of this contention, if proved, was that there was a
variance between the indictment and the proof which prejudiced
their trial rights. 143 · The argument obviously would have considerable impact in the hearsay area as well. That is, if the declarant could
not be properly held as part of a large conspiracy with another member, the declarations of the first conspirator could hardly be used
against the second.
The defendants named in the conspiracy court were engaged in
a wide range of activities. Moreover, other than their rather remote
dealings with a few of the principals in the case, these activities were
not related. For instance, several of the defendants had no contacts
whatsoever with Recea Hawkins and were engaged in a particular
type of criminal activity. In addition, although one of the defendants helped to conceal stolen meat, there was no evidence to indicate
that he knew that J.C. Hawkins was selling drugs to other persons.
Similarly, there was no showing that defendants who were furnishing counterfeit titles to a car theft ring knew that a man supplying
the titles was also stealing goods in interstate commerce. Without
such knowledge on the part of the defendants a successful single conspiracy prosecution for all these defendants was not likely without
RICO. This much the court conceded.
Applying pre-RICO conspiracy concepts to the facts of this
case, we doubt that a single conspiracy could be demonstrated . . . The enterprise involved in this case probably
could not have been successfully prosecuted as a single
conspiracy under the general federal conspiracy statute, 18
u.s.c. § 371. 144
141. /d. at 899.
142. /d. at 900.
143. Under Kotteakos v. United States, supra. See discussion in PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, supra, at § 4.03.
144. 571 F.2d at 902.
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No doubt the court's concessiOn was quite correct. Indeed,
there have been numerous cases in which suppliers of a small portion of a drug deal were found not to be members of the larger drug
operation precisely because they were not aware of the larger operation.145 To be sure, the Elliott court itself cited the Second Circuit's
holding in United States v. Bertolotti, 146 in which the court
focused on an alleged narcotics conspiracy that bore little
resemblence to "the orthodox business operation" found to
exist in other drug cases; many of the 'narcotics transactions" involved amounted to "little more than simple cash
thefts" in which no drugs changed hands. The onfy factor
that tied several isolated transactions together, the Court
noted, was the presence of two of the defendants . . . in
each. In effect, "[t]he scope of the operation was defined
only by [one defendant's] resourcefulness in devising new
methods to make money". Under these circumstances, the
Court held that the government had failed to prove the
existence of a single conspiracy. 147
Thus, without RICO, and without proof of knowledge of one conspirator as to the existence of other conspirators in wholly unrelated
activities (the drug transactions and the stolen meat transactions
were hardly bases for knowledge, whether implied or proven in fact),
the prosecutions would not and should not have been successful
under the general conspiracy statute. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the RICO conspiracy violations.
The government agreed with the defense that in its prosecution
it "attempted to achieve a broader application of RICO than has
heretofore been sanctioned." 148 All too clearly the government was
right. It is not only a broader application of RICO than in prior
cases, it is broader than the Constitution and good public policy al-

low. The Fifth Circuit, however, focusing on the Congressional purpose in enacting the Act, did not agree. The chief purpose was
"to seek the eradication of organized crime . . . by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal wtth the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 149
Because the general conspiracy statute, and existing conspiracy law,
145. United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975).
146. 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975).
147. 571 F.2d at 901-902.
148. 571 F.2d at 884. The court remarked: "RICO has displaced many of the legal
precepts traditionally applied to concerted criminal activity. Its effect in this case is to free the
government from the strictures of the multiple conspiracy doctrine and to allow the joint trial
of many persons accused of diversified crimes." /d. at 900.
149. /d. at 902, quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
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would not allow for the single conspiracy theory of the government,
the court concluded that RICO intended to authorize exactly that:
"the single prosecution of a multi-faceted, diversified conspiracy by
replacing the inadequate 'wheel' and 'chain' rationales with a new
statutory concept: the enterprise." 150
The magic of the RICO statute, of course, lies in the fact that in
charging a conspiracy to violate it, the government does not charge a
conspiracy to violate a particular law or statute but rather a conspiracy to "conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through

a pattern of racketeering activity." 151 According to the court, this
means that no defendant need agree to commit any particular criminal activities or even have knowledge of the nature of the other criminal activities. The defendants need only "agree to participate,
directly and indirectly in the affairs of the enterprise by committing
two or more predicate crimes." 152 The only real issue is whether the
court could "reasonably infer that each crime was intended to further the enterprise's affairs." 153 Once this overall objective of agreement to further the enterprise was found to exist, the many
defendants could be joined together, their statements used against
each of them, and, presumably, substantive offenses committed by
any one of them charged to the rest. 154
While the court found that under RICO "remote associates of
an enterprise may be convicted as conspirators on the basis of purely
circumstantial evidence," 155 it found no constitutional infirmity with
that conclusion. The statute only allowed conviction, in the court's
reasoning, if the defendant engaged in the commission of two or
more predicate crimes. Hence, the defendant was being convicted
because of his crimes, not because of the crimes of others.
The problem with the court's analysis is that in a case like Elliott it is not a fact that the defendant is being convicted of his crimes;
he is being convicted of the crimes of others. The court itself stated
that one of the defendants, who was engaged in an arson activity and
the theft of stolen meats and shirts, "may have been unaware that
others who agreed to participate in the enterprise's affairs did so by
selling drugs and murdering a key witness." 156 This is said to be
150. /d.

151. !d.

152. !d.
153.
154.
155.
156.

/d. at 902-903.
Under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
571 F.2d at 903.
/d. at 904.
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irrelevant to the question of whether he participated in the enterprise; he did that, according to the court, even though he did not
agree to commit each of the crimes and was unaware of them. True,
perhaps, except that the court itself defined the enterprise as a criminal activity involving, among other things, selling drugs and murdering witnesses. If the defendant had no knowledge of those activities,
and if the defendant could not reasonably have forseen them, it is
difficult to justify linking that person with the defendants who committed murder and who sold drugs, or binding him by their statements.

While the court perceived in this "no significant extension of a
co-conspirator's liability," 157 it is hard to see it as anything but a
tremendous extension, indeed, distortion of the concept of a co-conspirator's liability. In the Elliott case itself, four defendants who did
not commit murder were forced to stand trial with two others who
did. If they were all properly joined for trial, their statements could
have been used against each other. This does not go beyond the
scope of the co-conspirator's liability? No, says the court, even
though it "ups the ante for RICO violators who personally would
not contemplate taking a human life." 158 As has been pointed out
innumerable times, while the co-conspirator need not be aware of all
facets of the conspiracy, or of all members of it, he must have some
basic ideas as to what the agreement means. If he does not know the
nature of the enterprise in the broadest sense, it is difficult to see how
he could agree criminally to commit the act. 159 The Fifth Circuit
itself recognized this in a case decided after Elliott. "Nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose
or agreement as he understands it." 160
The court's RICO analysis goes well beyond even the Pinkerton
complicity formulation which itself has been subject to substantial
criticism. 161 In Pinkerton v. United States, 162 the Supreme Court
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See generally Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy: The Stale ofMind Crime-Intent, Proving
Intent, and Anti-Federal Intent, 1976 UN1V. OF ILL. LAW FoRUM 627.
160. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1269 (5th Cir. 1979) quoting Learned Hand's
famous opinion in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,403 (2d Cir. 1938). The court went on

to say, "It is not necessary that the members of the conspiracy know all the details of the plan,
but they must be aware of the essential nature and scope of the enterprise and intend to participate."
161. See Marcus, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Conspiracy Provisions, 1978 UN IV.
OF ILL. LAW FORUM 379, 381-82.
162. 328 u.s. 640 (1946).
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held that a conspirator would be liable for all criminal acts of his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy even if there were no
knowledge or discussion of those criminal acts, so long as those acts
were reasonably forseeable. As noted by a Section of the American
Bar Association, 163 this is broad liability, but at least it requires negligence, lack of due care. As the court in Elliott interprets RICO,
however, it appears that the liability of the defendant, going well
beyond the particular act to which he agreed or that is foreseen,
amounts to strict liability. That is, the defendant may have no
knowledge of activities such as murder or drug sales, such activities
may not be reasonably forseeable, and yet the defendant can be

joined with the persons who commit those crimes in a single conspiracy. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that statements made by
one conspirator could not be used against all of the conspirators
under the hearsay exception if this is a proper conspiracy. If this
does not come very close to being strict liability in the criminal context, it is difficult to see what would. The Elliott court wrote that the
RICO statute already had a "pervasive scope." Unfortunately,
under the facts in Elliott, and with the potential for further prosecutions, the court's construction of RICO allows for a far too pervasive
scope. To echo the words of Judge Ely in stressing concern over
large, joint conspiracy trials:
The prejudice to the individual defendant forced to defend
himself at a joint trial with numerous other alleged co-conspirators is compounded in instances where, as here, the
proof as readily mdicates the existence of a number of isolated transactions or several small conspiracies as it does
the single conspiracy chars.ed by the prosecution. Just as
the danger of inferrmg guilt from one codefendant to another increases in proportion to the number of persons
compelled to stand trial together, the danger of guilt by association at a multiple defendant trial mtensifies as the
number of possible conspiracies grows. Undoubtedly there
is a tendency for the jury to believe that a defendant must
have been involved m the alleged all-encompassing conspiracy, once it finds that individual to have committed one
of the minor acts which the prosecution contends is but an
extension of the greater conspiracy. 164
CoNCLUSIONS

Opinions which struggle to define and apply the co-conspira163. Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association Policy Regarding S-1, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code (94th Congress) at 5 (adopted August 1975).
164. United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 523 (9th Cir. 1979) [concurring opinion].
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tor's declaration rule continue to abound; although there is substantial basis for the use of the rule, the courts are constantly plagued by
difficult cases exploring the outer reaches of the principle and purpose behind the rule. With the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, many courts became concerned over legislative involvement
in this area. Today, however, the Rules stand as a unifying and legitimatizing force in this area.
While the courts must remain forever vigilant in avoiding ex-

cesses here, most federal judges in recent years have recognized the
problem and expressed their concern about it through careful scrutiny of the rule. The one very troubling judicial action in this area is
the sweeping interpretation given to the RICO statute. Such a reading can have only the most serious and negative effects in an already
complex and questionable area of prosecutorial activity.
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